修复站内回环投递依赖公网解析导致误判并补充验签回归
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/pem"
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"net"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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@@ -65,6 +66,71 @@ func TestCheckForDomainRequiresValidAlignedSignature(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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func TestLocalDeliveryRequiresCurrentKeyDomainAndLoopback(t *testing.T) {
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key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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otherKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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message := "From: sender@example.com\r\nTo: recipient@example.com\r\nSubject: local authentication\r\n\r\noriginal body\r\n"
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name, address, domain, selector string
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foreignKey, tampered, unsigned bool
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want bool
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}{
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{name: "ipv4_without_dns", address: "127.0.0.1", want: true},
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{name: "ipv6_without_dns", address: "::1", want: true},
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{name: "mapped_loopback", address: "::ffff:127.0.0.1", want: true},
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{name: "public_remote", address: "203.0.113.9"},
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{name: "private_remote", address: "10.0.0.9"},
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{name: "missing_remote"},
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{name: "foreign_domain", address: "127.0.0.1", domain: "other.example"},
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{name: "subdomain", address: "127.0.0.1", domain: "sub.example.com"},
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{name: "unknown_selector", address: "127.0.0.1", selector: "other"},
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{name: "wrong_key", address: "127.0.0.1", foreignKey: true},
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{name: "tampered", address: "127.0.0.1", tampered: true},
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{name: "unsigned", address: "127.0.0.1", unsigned: true},
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} {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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domain, selector := tc.domain, tc.selector
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if domain == "" {
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domain = "example.com"
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}
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if selector == "" {
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selector = "default"
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}
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signingKey := key
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if tc.foreignKey {
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signingKey = otherKey
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}
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data := message
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if !tc.unsigned {
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var signed bytes.Buffer
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if err := dkim.Sign(&signed, strings.NewReader(data), &dkim.SignOptions{Domain: domain, Selector: selector, Signer: signingKey}); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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data = signed.String()
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}
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if tc.tampered {
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data += "tampered body\r\n"
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}
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remote := &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP(tc.address), Port: 12345}
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if got := checkLocalDelivery(nil, strings.NewReader(data), domain, "example.com", remote, key); got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("本机投递认证结果为 %v,期望 %v", got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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if checkLocalDelivery(nil, strings.NewReader(message), "example.com", "example.com", nil, key) {
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t.Fatal("缺少连接地址时不能通过本机认证")
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}
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if checkLocalDelivery(nil, strings.NewReader(message), "example.com", "example.com", &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}, nil) {
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t.Fatal("缺少当前签名密钥时不能通过本机认证")
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}
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}
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func TestLoadPrivateKeyAcceptsStrongRSAKey(t *testing.T) {
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path := writeDKIMTestKey(t, 2048)
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signer, err := loadPrivateKey(path)
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