保存证书同步云端权限复测通过基线

This commit is contained in:
xuans committed 2026-09-20 04:49:03 +08:00
1 parent d6ea80a040
commit 353f545339
8 files changed
+258 -78

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+6 -2
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@@ -94,7 +94,9 @@ func (provider *aliDNSChallenge) Present(domain, token, keyAuth string) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
var response struct{ RecordID string `json:"RecordId"` }
var response struct {
RecordID string `json:"RecordId"`
}
err = provider.call("AddDomainRecord", url.Values{
"DomainName": {provider.zone}, "RR": {record.Name}, "Type": {"TXT"},
"Value": {record.Value}, "TTL": {"600"},
@@ -174,7 +176,9 @@ func (provider *aliDNSChallenge) call(action string, values url.Values, target a
if err != nil || len(data) > 1<<20 {
return errors.New("DNS 服务商响应无效")
}
var status struct{ Code string `json:"Code"` }
var status struct {
Code string `json:"Code"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(data, &status) != nil || response.StatusCode != http.StatusOK || status.Code != "" {
// 服务商错误可能包含凭据、签名或请求原文,不能直接交给日志。
return errors.New("DNS 服务商拒绝请求,请检查凭据、区域和记录管理权限")
@@ -35,10 +35,16 @@ func TestAutomaticDNSCleansOnlyOwnedUnchangedRecords(t *testing.T) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"RecordId": id})
case "DescribeDomainRecordInfo":
record := records[id]
if tamper { record.Value = "changed-by-user" }
if tamper {
record.Value = "changed-by-user"
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"RecordId": id, "DomainName": "example.com", "RR": record.Name, "Type": "TXT", "Value": record.Value})
case "DeleteDomainRecord":
if failDelete { w.WriteHeader(503); _, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"Code":"Busy"}`)); return }
if failDelete {
w.WriteHeader(503)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"Code":"Busy"}`))
return
}
deletes++
delete(records, id)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"RecordId": id})
@@ -55,23 +61,50 @@ func TestAutomaticDNSCleansOnlyOwnedUnchangedRecords(t *testing.T) {
workers.Add(1)
go func(domain string) {
defer workers.Done()
if err := provider.Present(domain, "token", "key-"+domain); err != nil { t.Error(err) }
if err := provider.Present(domain, "token", "key-"+domain); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}(domain)
}
}
workers.Wait()
if adds != 2 || len(records) != 3 { t.Fatalf("same-name TXT records lost or duplicated: adds=%d records=%d", adds, len(records)) }
if err := provider.CleanUp("other.example.com", "token", "unknown"); err != nil || deletes != 0 { t.Fatal("unknown challenge must not touch DNS") }
mu.Lock(); tamper = true; mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err == nil || deletes != 0 { t.Fatal("modified record must be retained") }
mu.Lock(); tamper = false; failDelete = true; mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err == nil || len(provider.records) != 2 { t.Fatal("failed deletion must retain ownership for retry") }
mu.Lock(); failDelete = false; mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if len(records) != 2 { t.Fatal("cleaning root challenge removed wildcard or unrelated TXT") }
if err := provider.CleanUp("*.example.com", "token", "key-*.example.com"); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if len(records) != 1 || records["existing"].Value != "unrelated-record" { t.Fatal("existing TXT must survive all challenge cleanup") }
if err := provider.CleanUp("*.example.com", "token", "key-*.example.com"); err != nil || deletes != 2 { t.Fatal("cleanup must be idempotent") }
if adds != 2 || len(records) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("same-name TXT records lost or duplicated: adds=%d records=%d", adds, len(records))
}
if err := provider.CleanUp("other.example.com", "token", "unknown"); err != nil || deletes != 0 {
t.Fatal("unknown challenge must not touch DNS")
}
mu.Lock()
tamper = true
mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err == nil || deletes != 0 {
t.Fatal("modified record must be retained")
}
mu.Lock()
tamper = false
failDelete = true
mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err == nil || len(provider.records) != 2 {
t.Fatal("failed deletion must retain ownership for retry")
}
mu.Lock()
failDelete = false
mu.Unlock()
if err := provider.CleanUp("example.com", "token", "key-example.com"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(records) != 2 {
t.Fatal("cleaning root challenge removed wildcard or unrelated TXT")
}
if err := provider.CleanUp("*.example.com", "token", "key-*.example.com"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(records) != 1 || records["existing"].Value != "unrelated-record" {
t.Fatal("existing TXT must survive all challenge cleanup")
}
if err := provider.CleanUp("*.example.com", "token", "key-*.example.com"); err != nil || deletes != 2 {
t.Fatal("cleanup must be idempotent")
}
}
func TestAutomaticDNSRejectsOutsideZoneAndRedactsErrors(t *testing.T) {
@@ -84,13 +117,21 @@ func TestAutomaticDNSRejectsOutsideZoneAndRedactsErrors(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
provider := &aliDNSChallenge{zone: "example.com", accessKey: "test-access", secretKey: "test-secret", endpoint: server.URL, client: server.Client(), records: map[string]aliDNSRecord{}}
if err := provider.Present("unrelated.com", "token", "key"); err == nil || calls != 0 { t.Fatal("out-of-zone write attempted") }
if err := provider.Present("unrelated.com", "token", "key"); err == nil || calls != 0 {
t.Fatal("out-of-zone write attempted")
}
err := provider.Present("example.com", "token", "key")
if err == nil || calls != 1 { t.Fatal("provider refusal not reported") }
if err == nil || calls != 1 {
t.Fatal("provider refusal not reported")
}
for _, secret := range []string{"test-access", "test-secret", "signature"} {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) { t.Fatal("error leaked provider response") }
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secret) {
t.Fatal("error leaked provider response")
}
}
for _, management := range []string{config.SSLManagementCustom, config.SSLManagementWebServer} {
if _, err := automaticDNSProvider(&config.Config{SSL: config.SSLConfig{Management: management, Challenge: config.SSLChallengeDNS}}); err == nil { t.Fatal("external certificate mode allowed automatic DNS") }
if _, err := automaticDNSProvider(&config.Config{SSL: config.SSLConfig{Management: management, Challenge: config.SSLChallengeDNS}}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("external certificate mode allowed automatic DNS")
}
}
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ func SetSSL(sslType, priKey, crtKey string) error {
Management: config.SSLManagementProject,
Mode: config.ManagedSSLModeDefault,
DefaultDirectory: runtimepath.SSLReference(config.ROOT_PATH, "data/ssl"),
DNSProvider: previousSSL.DNSProvider,
DNSZone: previousSSL.DNSZone,
DNSAccessKey: previousSSL.DNSAccessKey,
DNSSecretKey: previousSSL.DNSSecretKey,
DNSProvider: previousSSL.DNSProvider,
DNSZone: previousSSL.DNSZone,
DNSAccessKey: previousSSL.DNSAccessKey,
DNSSecretKey: previousSSL.DNSSecretKey,
}
if cfg.SSLType == config.SSLTypeAutoDNS {
cfg.SSL.Challenge = config.SSLChallengeDNS
@@ -192,10 +192,10 @@ func applyManagedSSLReference(cfg *config.Config, reference config.ManagedSSLRef
DefaultDirectory: "ssl",
CertificateRef: reference.CertificateRef,
PrivateKeyRef: reference.PrivateKeyRef,
DNSProvider: previousSSL.DNSProvider,
DNSZone: previousSSL.DNSZone,
DNSAccessKey: previousSSL.DNSAccessKey,
DNSSecretKey: previousSSL.DNSSecretKey,
DNSProvider: previousSSL.DNSProvider,
DNSZone: previousSSL.DNSZone,
DNSAccessKey: previousSSL.DNSAccessKey,
DNSSecretKey: previousSSL.DNSSecretKey,
}
if reference.Mode == config.ManagedSSLModeUpload {
cfg.SSL.CustomDirectory = "ssl"