diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_evidence.go b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_evidence.go
index 07038a1..20269be 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_evidence.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_evidence.go
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ type RecoveryEvidence struct {
 	ValidationCommand  []string          `json:"validation_command"`
 	ReloadCommand      []string          `json:"reload_command"`
 	Files              map[string]string `json:"files"`
+	TemporaryFiles     map[string]string `json:"temporary_files,omitempty"`
 	Baseline           RecoveryBaseline  `json:"baseline"`
 }
 
@@ -112,14 +113,21 @@ func validateRecoveryEvidence(record TransactionRecord, server Server) error {
 		}
 		locks[lock] = true
 	}
+	temporaryPaths := make(map[string]bool)
 	for _, temporary := range record.TemporaryPaths {
 		matched := false
 		for path := range paths {
 			matched = matched || temporary == path+".scert-tmp-"+record.ID
 		}
-		if !matched {
+		if !matched || temporaryPaths[temporary] {
 			return errors.New("部署事务临时路径无效")
 		}
+		temporaryPaths[temporary] = true
+	}
+	for path, digest := range e.TemporaryFiles {
+		if !temporaryPaths[path] || !validDigest(digest) {
+			return errors.New("部署事务临时文件归属证据无效")
+		}
 	}
 	seen := make(map[string]bool)
 	for _, backup := range record.Backups {
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight.go b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight.go
index fa49085..4d84e31 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight.go
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ func validateRollbackFiles(ctx context.Context, client Client, record Transactio
 	if err := validateTransactionLocks(ctx, client, record, false); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	if err := validateTemporaryFiles(ctx, client, record); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	for _, backup := range record.Backups {
 		backupExists, err := validateRecoveryBackup(ctx, client, backup)
 		if err != nil {
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_sftp_test.go b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_sftp_test.go
index e9a8529..24a289e 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_sftp_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_sftp_test.go
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func TestRecoveryPreflightOverPasswordSFTP(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 		return nil
 	}, serveTestSFTP, hostSigner)
-	for _, scenario := range []string{"foreign_lock", "missing_owner", "changed_backup", "changed_target", "valid_restore"} {
+	for _, scenario := range []string{"foreign_lock", "missing_owner", "changed_backup", "changed_target", "changed_temporary", "unrecorded_temporary", "valid_restore"} {
 		t.Run(scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
 			root := t.TempDir()
 			server, memory, r := recoveryPreflightFixture(root)
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ func TestRecoveryPreflightOverPasswordSFTP(t *testing.T) {
 				memory.files[r.Backups[0].Saved] = memoryFile{data: []byte("unexpected-backup")}
 			case "changed_target":
 				memory.files[r.Paths[0]] = memoryFile{data: []byte("unexpected-target")}
+			case "changed_temporary":
+				memory.files[r.TemporaryPaths[2]] = memoryFile{data: []byte("unexpected-temporary")}
+			case "unrecorded_temporary":
+				delete(r.Evidence.TemporaryFiles, r.TemporaryPaths[2])
 			}
 			for path, file := range memory.files {
 				if strings.HasSuffix(path, ".scert-lock") {
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_test.go b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_test.go
index 0420377..7910c38 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/recovery_preflight_test.go
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func recoveryPreflightFixture(roots ...string) (Server, *memoryClient, Transacti
 			Version: 1, LockToken: contentDigest([]byte("preflight-owner")),
 			Address: server.Address, Port: server.Port, HostKeyFingerprint: server.HostKeyFingerprint,
 			ValidationCommand: server.ValidationCommand, ReloadCommand: server.ReloadCommand,
-			Files: map[string]string{}, Baseline: RecoveryBaseline{
+			Files: map[string]string{}, TemporaryFiles: map[string]string{}, Baseline: RecoveryBaseline{
 				Endpoint: "https://example.com", Domains: []string{"example.com"},
 				PreviousFingerprint: "old", ExpectedFingerprint: "new",
 			},
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ func recoveryPreflightFixture(roots ...string) (Server, *memoryClient, Transacti
 			Original: path, Saved: backup, OriginalExists: true, OriginalDigest: contentDigest([]byte("old")),
 		})
 		r.Evidence.Files[path] = contentDigest([]byte("new"))
+		r.Evidence.TemporaryFiles[temporary] = contentDigest([]byte("partial"))
 		client.files[lock] = memoryFile{}
 		client.files[lock+"/owner"] = memoryFile{data: []byte(r.Evidence.LockToken), mode: 0o600}
 		client.files[backup] = memoryFile{data: []byte("old"), mode: 0o600}
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/service.go b/backend/internal/deployment/service.go
index f74bd96..b3c5614 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/service.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/service.go
@@ -368,13 +368,21 @@ func (s *Service) deployOne(ctx context.Context, server Server, artifact Artifac
 		temporaryPath := file.path + ".scert-tmp-" + backupID
 		// 上传失败也可能留下半份私钥，必须在开始上传前登记清理路径。
 		temporary = append(temporary, temporaryPath)
-		if err := client.Upload(ctx, temporaryPath, file.data, file.mode); err != nil {
+		uploadErr := client.Upload(ctx, temporaryPath, file.data, file.mode)
+		if uploadErr != nil {
 			var notCreated *uploadNotCreatedError
-			if errors.As(err, &notCreated) {
+			if errors.As(uploadErr, &notCreated) {
 				temporary = temporary[:len(temporary)-1]
-				return failed(fmt.Sprintf("上传失败且未确认临时路径所有权，已保留 %s 供人工核查：%v", temporaryPath, err))
+				return failed(fmt.Sprintf("上传失败且未确认临时路径所有权，已保留 %s 供人工核查：%v", temporaryPath, uploadErr))
 			}
-			return failed(fmt.Sprintf("上传远程证书失败：%v", err))
+		}
+		if transactionEnabled {
+			if err := s.captureUploadEvidence(ctx, server, &client, journalRecord, temporaryPath, file.data, uploadErr); err != nil {
+				return failed(fmt.Sprintf("保存临时文件归属证据失败：%v", err))
+			}
+		}
+		if uploadErr != nil {
+			return failed(fmt.Sprintf("上传远程证书失败：%v", uploadErr))
 		}
 	}
 	if err := persistTransaction(ctx, TransactionPhaseUploaded); err != nil {
@@ -699,6 +707,9 @@ func (s *Service) recoverCommittedTransaction(ctx context.Context, record *Trans
 			return err
 		}
 	}
+	if err := validateTemporaryFiles(ctx, client, *record); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	for _, backup := range record.Backups {
 		if _, err := validateRecoveryBackup(ctx, client, backup); err != nil {
 			return err
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/transaction_recovery_test.go b/backend/internal/deployment/transaction_recovery_test.go
index 714ca8a..65b1f7b 100644
--- a/backend/internal/deployment/transaction_recovery_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/transaction_recovery_test.go
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ func TestRecoverPendingRollsBackOwnedDeployment(t *testing.T) {
 		Phase: TransactionPhaseReloadAttempted, Status: TransactionStatusPending,
 		Evidence: &RecoveryEvidence{Version: 1, LockToken: contentDigest([]byte("scert-lock:" + id)), Address: server.Address, Port: server.Port, HostKeyFingerprint: server.HostKeyFingerprint, ValidationCommand: append([]string(nil), server.ValidationCommand...), ReloadCommand: append([]string(nil), server.ReloadCommand...), Files: files, Baseline: RecoveryBaseline{PreviousFingerprint: "old", Endpoint: "https://example.com", Domains: []string{"example.com"}}},
 	}}}
+	journal.pending[0].Evidence.TemporaryFiles = make(map[string]string)
+	for _, path := range temporary {
+		journal.pending[0].Evidence.TemporaryFiles[path] = contentDigest([]byte("partial"))
+	}
 	service := NewServiceWithJournal(memoryFactory{clients: map[string]*memoryClient{server.ID: client}}, journal)
 	service.VerifyRecoveryTarget = func(context.Context, Server, RecoveryBaseline, bool) error { return nil }
 	if err := service.RecoverPending(t.Context(), func(context.Context, string) (Server, error) { return server, nil }); err != nil {
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership.go b/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d5794e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership.go
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package deployment
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+// captureUploadEvidence 只记录已确认独占创建的文件，计划路径不构成所有权证据。
+// 创建响应丢失、摘要读取失败或证据未落库时，重启恢复必须保留未知文件。
+func (s *Service) captureUploadEvidence(ctx context.Context, server Server, client *Client, record *TransactionRecord, path string, data []byte, uploadErr error) error {
+	evidenceContext, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), deploymentRollbackTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	digest := contentDigest(data)
+	if uploadErr != nil {
+		if err := reconnectDeploymentClient(evidenceContext, s.factory, server, client); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("读取部分上传证据前重连失败：%w", err)
+		}
+		reader, ok := (*client).(EvidenceClient)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("客户端无法核验部分上传文件")
+		}
+		var err error
+		digest, err = reader.FileDigest(evidenceContext, path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("读取部分上传摘要失败：%w", err)
+		}
+		if !validDigest(digest) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("部分上传摘要无效")
+		}
+	}
+	if record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles == nil {
+		record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles = make(map[string]string)
+	}
+	record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles[path] = digest
+	record.UpdatedAt = s.now().UTC()
+	return s.journal.UpdateDeploymentTransaction(evidenceContext, *record)
+}
+
+// validateTemporaryFiles 在删除任何临时文件前完整检查实际归属及内容身份。
+// 旧日志只有计划路径而没有创建证据时，不自动删除仍存在的文件。
+func validateTemporaryFiles(ctx context.Context, client Client, record TransactionRecord) error {
+	for _, path := range record.TemporaryPaths {
+		exists, err := client.Exists(ctx, path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("检查临时文件失败：%w", err)
+		}
+		if !exists {
+			continue
+		}
+		if record.Evidence == nil || !validDigest(record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles[path]) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("无法证明临时文件归属，已保留现场：%s", path)
+		}
+		if err := checkFileDigest(ctx, client, path, record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles[path]); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("临时文件身份已变更，已保留现场：%w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership_test.go b/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e65ce22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/internal/deployment/upload_ownership_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+package deployment
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"maps"
+	"reflect"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type journalCollisionClient struct {
+	*memoryClient
+	collisionAt int
+	calls       int
+	collided    string
+}
+
+func (c *journalCollisionClient) Upload(ctx context.Context, path string, data []byte, mode uint32) error {
+	c.calls++
+	if c.calls == c.collisionAt {
+		c.collided = path
+		c.files[path] = memoryFile{data: []byte("not-owned"), mode: 0o600}
+		return &uploadNotCreatedError{err: errors.New("模拟独占创建冲突")}
+	}
+	return c.memoryClient.Upload(ctx, path, data, mode)
+}
+
+func TestJournalUploadCollisionPreservesUnownedFile(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, position := range []int{1, 3} {
+		t.Run(strconv.Itoa(position), func(t *testing.T) {
+			client := &journalCollisionClient{memoryClient: newMemoryClient(), collisionAt: position}
+			server := testServer("journal-collision")
+			client.files[server.CertificatePath] = memoryFile{data: []byte("current"), mode: 0o600}
+			journal := &memoryTransactionJournal{}
+			service := NewServiceWithJournal(fixedClientFactory{client}, journal)
+			ctx := WithTransactionContext(t.Context(), TransactionContext{TaskID: "task", AttemptID: "attempt", AttemptNumber: 1})
+			report := service.Deploy(ctx, []Target{{Server: server}}, testArtifact(t))
+			if report.Status != "failed" || client.collided == "" {
+				t.Fatalf("必须触发上传碰撞：%+v", report)
+			}
+			if string(client.files[client.collided].data) != "not-owned" {
+				t.Error("事务日志不得把计划路径当作已取得所有权的临时文件删除")
+			}
+			if string(client.files[server.CertificatePath].data) != "current" || len(client.commands) != 0 {
+				t.Fatal("上传碰撞不得改变当前证书或执行命令")
+			}
+			if len(journal.finished) != 1 || journal.finished[0].status != TransactionStatusRecoveryRequired {
+				t.Fatal("碰撞路径归属未知，必须保留锁及事务等待核查")
+			}
+			for _, target := range []string{server.CertificatePath, server.CertificateChainPath, server.PrivateKeyPath} {
+				if _, exists := client.files[target+".scert-lock"]; !exists {
+					t.Fatal("未知文件仍存在时不得自动释放部署锁")
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecoveryRejectsUnprovenTemporaryFileBeforeMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, scenario := range []string{"changed", "unrecorded", "commit_changed", "legacy", "legacy_commit"} {
+		t.Run(scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
+			server, client, record := recoveryPreflightFixture()
+			switch scenario {
+			case "legacy", "legacy_commit":
+				record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles = nil
+			case "unrecorded":
+				delete(record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles, record.TemporaryPaths[2])
+			}
+			if scenario == "commit_changed" || scenario == "legacy_commit" {
+				record.Phase = TransactionPhaseCommitting
+			}
+			client.files[record.TemporaryPaths[2]] = memoryFile{data: []byte("foreign-file"), mode: 0o600}
+			journal := &memoryTransactionJournal{pending: []TransactionRecord{record}}
+			service := NewServiceWithJournal(fixedClientFactory{client}, journal)
+			service.VerifyRecoveryTarget = func(context.Context, Server, RecoveryBaseline, bool) error { return nil }
+			before := maps.Clone(client.files)
+			err := service.RecoverPending(t.Context(), func(context.Context, string) (Server, error) { return server, nil })
+			if err == nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(client.files, before) || len(client.commands) != 0 {
+				t.Fatal("无法证明临时文件身份时必须保留完整现场，不得先删除其他文件")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestJournalPartialUploadCleansOnlyProvenFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	client := newMemoryClient()
+	client.uploadError = "key.pem"
+	server := testServer("journal-partial")
+	for _, path := range []string{server.CertificatePath, server.CertificateChainPath, server.PrivateKeyPath} {
+		client.files[path] = memoryFile{data: []byte("original"), mode: 0o600}
+	}
+	before := maps.Clone(client.files)
+	journal := &memoryTransactionJournal{}
+	service := NewServiceWithJournal(fixedClientFactory{client}, journal)
+	ctx := WithTransactionContext(t.Context(), TransactionContext{TaskID: "task", AttemptID: "attempt", AttemptNumber: 1})
+	report := service.Deploy(ctx, []Target{{Server: server}}, testArtifact(t))
+	if report.Status != "failed" || !reflect.DeepEqual(client.files, before) || len(client.commands) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("已取得归属的半份私钥应可安全清理，且不改变旧证书：%+v", report)
+	}
+	if len(journal.finished) != 1 || journal.finished[0].status != TransactionStatusRolledBack {
+		t.Fatal("已证明归属的上传失败应完成回滚")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecoveryLegacyWithoutTemporaryFilesStillRestores(t *testing.T) {
+	server, client, record := recoveryPreflightFixture()
+	record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles = nil
+	for _, path := range record.TemporaryPaths {
+		delete(client.files, path)
+	}
+	journal := &memoryTransactionJournal{pending: []TransactionRecord{record}}
+	service := NewServiceWithJournal(fixedClientFactory{client}, journal)
+	service.VerifyRecoveryTarget = func(context.Context, Server, RecoveryBaseline, bool) error { return nil }
+	if err := service.RecoverPending(t.Context(), func(context.Context, string) (Server, error) { return server, nil }); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("没有残留临时文件且其他证据完整的旧事务仍应恢复：%v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecoveryRejectsMalformedTemporaryOwnershipBeforeAuthentication(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, scenario := range []string{"foreign_path", "invalid_digest", "duplicate_path"} {
+		t.Run(scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
+			server, _, record := recoveryPreflightFixture()
+			switch scenario {
+			case "foreign_path":
+				record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles["/foreign/file"] = contentDigest([]byte("foreign"))
+			case "invalid_digest":
+				record.Evidence.TemporaryFiles[record.TemporaryPaths[0]] = "invalid"
+			case "duplicate_path":
+				record.TemporaryPaths = append(record.TemporaryPaths, record.TemporaryPaths[0])
+			}
+			if err := validateRecoveryEvidence(record, server); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("认证前必须拒绝无效临时文件证据")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
diff --git a/doc/Linux生产流程测试记录.md b/doc/Linux生产流程测试记录.md
index 887e8f5..48d760f 100644
--- a/doc/Linux生产流程测试记录.md
+++ b/doc/Linux生产流程测试记录.md
@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 # Linux 生产流程测试记录
 
+## 2026年10月2日13:41 上传归属与扩大回归
+
+- [x] 同一隔离目录的 `upload-baseline.log`：带事务日志的上传碰撞保护和未知临时文件恢复保护两个场景均失败，退出码 1，确认原实现会误删。
+- [x] 增加临时文件归属摘要字段，只有独占创建确认后才登记并持久化；回滚及提交恢复在任何清理前核验完整临时文件集合。旧日志仍有临时文件但缺少归属证据时保留现场，无残留文件且其他证据完整的旧事务仍可恢复。
+- [x] `upload-fixed.log` 中 deployment、repository、app 均通过，退出码 0；`upload-repeat.log` 中恢复及事务用例重复二十次退出 0；`full-vet.log` 全后端静态检查退出 0。
+- [x] 真实回环密码 SSH/SFTP 用例扩展为七个场景，包括临时文件变更和归属未落库，不能用此替代业务服务器完整恢复流程。
+- [!] `full-backend.log` 全后端测试退出 1：admin 重置状态文件、certificate 敏感信息目录及部分 database 测试仍错误使用 `/scert` 正式路径，被 nobody 拒绝；发布边界测试缺 `.gitignore` 及正式构建入口。没有提权或放宽生产权限，待测试隔离修复及完整源码复测。
+- [~] 第一台只读检查发现已有 gcc，下一步可在独立非特权目录补做 Linux 竞争检测；此前第二台的失败不改写为通过。尚未构建部署本批修复。
+
 ## 2026年10月2日13:30 恢复预检原生 Linux 回归
 
 本轮为第二台隔离源码测试，不是清库首次生产验收。使用 nobody、Go 1.26.6 和临时目录；未修改业务数据库、服务配置、Nginx 或公网端口。线上仍为此前 1150c39 对应发行包。
diff --git a/doc/Scert整改任务执行清单.md b/doc/Scert整改任务执行清单.md
index 3868ec7..08fc6f6 100644
--- a/doc/Scert整改任务执行清单.md
+++ b/doc/Scert整改任务执行清单.md
@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # Scert 整改任务执行清单
 
+## 2026年10月2日13:41 当前任务入口
+
+- [x] T2-E：已复现上传碰撞误删；修复为独占创建确认、摘要落库与整组临时文件预检，碰撞、变更及旧日志缺归属证据均保留现场。
+- [x] T2-E 回归：三包原生测试、恢复及事务用例重复二十次、全后端 go vet 通过；可信半份私钥清理及无残留临时文件的旧事务兼容路径保留。
+- [~] T2-G：全后端原生测试暴露旧测试污染正式路径的问题；修复测试临时路径，并用包含构建文件的完整仓库重新执行。
+- [ ] T2-F：新候选正式构建、双机部署及业务实机恢复复审仍待完成。
+- [!] 总体生产门禁不放行，历史缺证据事务不得伪造记录或删锁。
+
 ## 2026年10月2日13:30 当前执行入口
 
 需求确认：仅 Linux，沿用 P0-10 恢复安全和生产门禁；未知归属不得自动接管，公网只走 Nginx 80/443，不放宽校验，不使用辅助脚本作为验收依据。
diff --git a/doc/Scert整改合并优化清单.md b/doc/Scert整改合并优化清单.md
index 34a5142..2aaf84f 100644
--- a/doc/Scert整改合并优化清单.md
+++ b/doc/Scert整改合并优化清单.md
@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # Scert 整改、合并与优化清单
 
+## 2026年10月2日13:41 上传归属安全整改
+
+- [x] 已复现并修复带事务日志时误删上传碰撞文件、恢复时误删身份已变更临时文件的问题；旧实现两个新增场景均失败。
+- [x] 只有独占创建已确认并记录实际上传摘要的文件才允许清理；计划路径不是归属证据。半份私钥在归属及摘要可信时仍能安全清理，未知归属保留文件和锁等待核查。
+- [x] 三包原生 Linux 回归、恢复及事务场景重复二十次、全后端 go vet 通过；真实回环密码 SFTP 增加临时文件变更及归属未落库保护。
+- [!] 扩大到全后端测试未通过：发现 admin、certificate、database 的旧测试仍使用正式安装目录，另有发布测试因隔离目录未包含仓库构建文件失败。将修复测试隔离并从完整干净源码复测，不提权或修改生产路径规避。
+- [~] P0-10 与整体生产验收仍未通过，本批修复尚未正式构建部署。
+
 ## 2026年10月2日13:30 恢复安全整改进度
 
 - [x] P0-10 子项：恢复前完整核验锁集合、备份摘要及当前目标身份；存在但无归属的锁拒绝自动处理，已验证阶段允许部分解锁后重入。